Moral Realism Explained
Moral realism is a philosophical theory that posits the existence of objective moral facts and values that are independent of human beliefs, attitudes, and cultural practices. According to moral realism, moral truths are grounded in the nature of reality, just like scientific truths, and can be discovered through rational inquiry and empirical observation. Moral realism is often contrasted with other moral theories, such as relativism, subjectivism, and nihilism, which deny or minimize the objectivity and universality of morality.
Theoretical Framework of Moral Realism
Moral realism is typically divided into two main branches: naturalism and non-naturalism. Naturalism holds that moral facts and values are reducible to or supervene on natural facts and values, such as biological, psychological, or social facts and values. Non-naturalism, on the other hand, maintains that moral facts and values are irreducible to or independent of natural facts and values, and require a sui generis ontological status, such as being non-causal, non-natural, or non-reducible. Moral realism also includes other sub-theories, such as intuitionism, which claims that moral knowledge is non-inferential and self-evident, and ethical non-cognitivism, which denies that moral sentences express propositions that can be true or false.
The Challenge of Moral Disagreement
One of the main challenges to moral realism is the problem of moral disagreement, which refers to the fact that different individuals, societies, and cultures hold conflicting moral beliefs and values. If moral realism is true, then it seems that there should be a unique and universal moral code that all rational agents can discover and agree upon. However, the empirical evidence shows that there is significant variability and diversity in moral judgments across time and space, which suggests that moral realism may be mistaken or incomplete. Some moral realists argue that moral disagreement can be resolved by appealing to reason, evidence, and dialogue, while others claim that moral disagreement is evidence against moral realism or requires a revision of its scope and methodology.
The Problem of Moral Motivation
Another challenge to moral realism is the problem of moral motivation, which refers to the gap between knowing what is morally right or wrong and being motivated to act accordingly. If moral facts and values are objective and independent of human desires and interests, then why should rational agents care about them and act on them? Some moral realists claim that moral motivation is built into human nature or that moral reasons are the most compelling and rational reasons, while others argue that moral motivation is a contingent and context-dependent phenomenon that cannot be derived from moral facts and values alone.
Criticisms of Non-Naturalism and Intuitionism
Non-naturalism and intuitionism have been criticized for being metaphysically mysterious, epistemologically unreliable, and normatively inert. Non-naturalism is accused of positing a non-explanatory or ad hoc ontology of moral properties and relations that cannot be empirically verified or explained. Intuitionism is criticized for assuming an unjustified and dogmatic reliance on intuition as a source of moral knowledge, which is vulnerable to error, bias, and cultural conditioning. Both non-naturalism and intuitionism also face the challenge of explaining how moral properties and relations can be causally efficacious or relevant to human behavior and decision-making.
The Naturalistic Fallacy
Naturalism has been criticized for committing the naturalistic fallacy, which is the inference from descriptive statements about what is the case to normative statements about what ought to be the case. According to the naturalistic fallacy, moral properties and values cannot be derived from or reduced to natural properties and values, since they involve a different kind of normativity and normative force. For example, the fact that humans have evolved to cooperate and care for each other does not entail that they ought to do so, or that altruism is morally desirable. Naturalists respond to the naturalistic fallacy by arguing that moral properties and values can be defined in terms of naturalistic properties and values, or that the gap between the descriptive and normative domains can be bridged by rational reflection and deliberation.
The Evolutionary Explanation of Morality
The evolutionary explanation of morality is a naturalistic theory that seeks to explain the origin, function, and variability of moral behavior and attitudes in terms of biological and cultural evolution. According to this theory, morality is a product of natural selection and cultural transmission, and serves to promote cooperation, reciprocity, and social cohesion among humans and other animals. The evolutionary explanation of morality challenges moral realism by suggesting that moral facts and values are not independent of human biology and culture, but are rather contingent and adaptive responses to environmental pressures and historical contingencies.
The Role of Emotions in Moral Realism
Emotions play a crucial role in moral realism by providing the motivational and affective basis for moral judgment and action. Emotions such as empathy, sympathy, guilt, shame, and indignation are seen as essential components of moral experience, and as signaling the presence or absence of moral values and norms. However, emotions also pose a challenge to moral realism by being context-dependent, subjective, and susceptible to biases and errors. Emotions can also conflict with reason and evidence, and lead to moral irrationality and inconsistency.
The Problem of Moral Error Theory
Moral error theory is a non-cognitivist theory that denies the truth or falsity of moral sentences, and claims that they are expressions of attitudes, preferences, or commands, rather than assertions of facts or values. According to moral error theory, moral judgments and beliefs are systematically mistaken or false, since there are no objective moral properties or values to refer to. Moral error theory challenges moral realism by rejecting its fundamental assumptions about the objectivity and universality of morality, and by insisting that moral discourse is a form of emotive or prescriptive language, rather than a descriptive or evaluative one.
The Contextualist Critique of Moral Realism
Contextualism is a relativistic theory that emphasizes the role of context and perspective in shaping moral beliefs and values. According to contextualism, moral truths are not objective or universal, but are rather relative to the particular social, historical, and cultural context in which they are embedded. Contextualism challenges moral realism by denying that there can be a single and fixed moral code that applies to all rational agents, and by highlighting the diversity and contingency of moral judgments and practices across different contexts and perspectives.
The Alternative Theories of Morality
There are several alternative theories of morality that challenge moral realism, such as relativism, subjectivism, nihilism, and pragmatism. Relativism holds that moral truths are relative to the individual, group, or culture that holds them, and that there are no universal or objective moral standards. Subjectivism holds that moral judgments are subjective and grounded in personal preferences or attitudes, rather than objective or universal facts. Nihilism holds that morality is an illusion or a mistake, and that there are no moral values or duties. Pragmatism holds that morality is a practical and fallible tool for achieving human ends and purposes, rather than a transcendent or absolute standard.
Conclusion: The Limits of Moral Realism
Moral realism faces a number of challenges and criticisms that question its plausibility and coherence as a philosophical theory. While moral realism has some intuitive appeal and explanatory power, it also has several limitations and drawbacks that need to be addressed. The problem of moral disagreement, the problem of moral motivation, and the problem of moral error theory are among the most pressing challenges to moral realism, as they call into question its objectivity, universality, and practical relevance. The alternative theories of morality offer some compelling alternatives to moral realism, but also raise new questions and difficulties that require further investigation and reflection. Ultimately, the limits of moral realism depend on the scope and methodology of moral inquiry, as well as on the context and perspective of the moral agent.
